Fixed-Price Incentive Firm Target (FPIF)
A fixed-price incentive firm target (FPIF) contract sets a target cost, target profit, price ceiling, and profit adjustment formula at award under FAR 16.403-1. Final profit moves against actual cost through the share formula, and every dollar above the ceiling is the contractor's loss.
The parties set four numbers at award: target cost, target profit, a price ceiling (no profit ceiling or floor), and a profit adjustment formula (FAR 16.403-1). At completion the parties negotiate final cost and the formula sets final profit: underrun the target and profit rises; overrun it and profit falls, or turns into loss. Cost above the ceiling is the contractor's alone.
FAR 16.403-1(c) sets two gates: an accounting system adequate to support final-cost negotiation, and cost or pricing information adequate to fix firm targets at initial negotiation. DFARS 216.403-1 tells DoD buyers to give the type particular consideration as programs move from development to production, with a 120 percent ceiling and 50/50 share ratio as the point of departure.
The 120/50-50 point of departure is not an answer. Where the share line meets the ceiling, government participation in overruns ends and every further dollar is contractor loss — a structure adopted by reflex prices that point untested against the program's actual cost risk.
Regulatory Reference
FAR 16.403-1; DFARS 216.403-1
RFO Status
The Part 16 model deviation moves fixed-price incentive coverage into a dedicated incentive subpart at 16.404-1, adopted at GSA as class deviation RFO-2025-16 (issued September 29, 2025, effective November 3, 2025) and at DoD through class deviation 2026-O0045 (effective February 20, 2026); new section 16.104 carries Executive Order 14402's fixed-price preference, and Part 16 is not among the June 23, 2026 first-batch proposed rules. (verified September 17, 2026)
Category
Contract Types & Vehicles
How AcqBot Helps
AcqBot builds the FPIF arithmetic into the contract-type determination: it checks the 16.403-1(c) gates against the record, models candidate share ratios and ceilings against the program cost estimate instead of defaulting to 120/50-50, and drafts the incentive-arrangement rationale for the file.
Related glossary entries
Other Transaction Authority (OTA)
Other Transaction Authority (OTA) lets certain agencies enter agreements for research, prototypes, and follow-on production that are not standard procurement contracts — largely exempt from the FAR — to attract nontraditional contractors and move faster than conventional acquisition allows.
Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)
An Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract buys an unspecified quantity of supplies or services, within stated minimum and maximum limits, over a fixed period. The government buys through task or delivery orders under FAR 16.504, with a preference for multiple awards.
Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP)
A firm-fixed-price (FFP) contract sets a price that is not subject to adjustment based on the contractor's cost experience in performance. FAR 16.202 places maximum cost risk on the contractor, who absorbs every overrun and keeps every underrun.
Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF)
A cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) contract reimburses allowable costs and pays a fee negotiated and fixed at inception. The fee does not vary with actual cost, though it may adjust when the work changes. FAR 16.306 governs; statutory caps limit the fee.