Fixed-Price Incentive Firm Target (FPIF)

A fixed-price incentive firm target (FPIF) contract sets a target cost, target profit, price ceiling, and profit adjustment formula at award under FAR 16.403-1. Final profit moves against actual cost through the share formula, and every dollar above the ceiling is the contractor's loss.

The parties set four numbers at award: target cost, target profit, a price ceiling (no profit ceiling or floor), and a profit adjustment formula (FAR 16.403-1). At completion the parties negotiate final cost and the formula sets final profit: underrun the target and profit rises; overrun it and profit falls, or turns into loss. Cost above the ceiling is the contractor's alone.

FAR 16.403-1(c) sets two gates: an accounting system adequate to support final-cost negotiation, and cost or pricing information adequate to fix firm targets at initial negotiation. DFARS 216.403-1 tells DoD buyers to give the type particular consideration as programs move from development to production, with a 120 percent ceiling and 50/50 share ratio as the point of departure.

The 120/50-50 point of departure is not an answer. Where the share line meets the ceiling, government participation in overruns ends and every further dollar is contractor loss — a structure adopted by reflex prices that point untested against the program's actual cost risk.

Regulatory Reference

FAR 16.403-1; DFARS 216.403-1

RFO Status

The Part 16 model deviation moves fixed-price incentive coverage into a dedicated incentive subpart at 16.404-1, adopted at GSA as class deviation RFO-2025-16 (issued September 29, 2025, effective November 3, 2025) and at DoD through class deviation 2026-O0045 (effective February 20, 2026); new section 16.104 carries Executive Order 14402's fixed-price preference, and Part 16 is not among the June 23, 2026 first-batch proposed rules. (verified September 17, 2026)

Category

Contract Types & Vehicles

How AcqBot Helps

AcqBot builds the FPIF arithmetic into the contract-type determination: it checks the 16.403-1(c) gates against the record, models candidate share ratios and ceilings against the program cost estimate instead of defaulting to 120/50-50, and drafts the incentive-arrangement rationale for the file.